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ABSTRACT: The Water Framework Directive (WFD) not only recast water management practices within the 
European Union (EU); it also opened a new chapter for the EU’s external ambitions in the field of water. The central 
vehicle here is the EU Water Initiative (EUWI), a transnational, multi-actor partnership approach that was 
established in 2002 to support wider United Nations development goals. The EUWI is underpinned by principles 
such as river basin planning, resource efficiency, and participation, and the WFD serves as a legal and political 
template for achieving these aims in interested partner countries. This article analyses the implementation of the 
Initiative in all five partnerships: Africa, China, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Latin America, and 
the Mediterranean; it argues that the Initiative’s origins in sustainable development related global debates led to 
selective interpretations of water management principles in these diverse social, political and ecological contexts. 
In short, these five partnerships emphasise different aspects of the three pillars of sustainable development, and 
their respective interpretations result in the different WFD variants outside of Europe. These patterns, we argue, 
not only reflect contextual differences but also strategic EU and member state foreign policy imperatives that have 
influenced how the WFD has been promoted globally. 
 
KEYWORDS: Water Framework Directive, European Union Water Initiative, integrated water resources 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is an ambitious piece of European Union (EU) water legislation. 
Adopted 20 years ago, the Directive requires EU member states to adopt River Basin Management Plans 
(RBMPs) and Programmes of Measures (PoMs) with a view to improving the status of surface, coastal 
and groundwater resources (Kallis and Butler, 2001; Kaika, 2003). Water authorities are encouraged to 
involve stakeholders and the wider public in decision-making processes and to organise planning and 
management activities at hydrological rather than administrative scales (Moss, 2012; Jager et al., 2016). 
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All EU member states are obliged to implement the WFD. Unless exemptions apply, this includes the 
so-called outermost regions of the EU, that is, member state territories located at a significant distance 
from Europe’s mainland. The WFD, however, is not legally binding in overseas countries and territories, 
i.e. jurisdictions that are characterised by a dependent relationship with an EU member state without 
being part of the EU (Murray, 2012). The WFD is also partly or fully in force in a number of associated 
countries; in this category are member states of the European Economic Area such as Norway (Hovik and 
Hanssen, 2016) or EU membership candidates such as Turkey (Demirbilek and Benson, 2019). Taken 
together, this context both defines and confines the WFD’s geographical area of application; various 
contributions to this Special Issue assess the extent to which the hopes and expectations pinned on the 
WFD when it was developed two decades ago were justified. 
This is, however, just one side of the coin. The WFD not only recast water management discourses 
and practices within the EU; it also opened a new chapter in the EU’s external ambitions in the field of 
water (Fritsch and Benson, 2019). The central vehicle here is the EU Water Initiative (EUWI). 
Established in 2002 under the auspices of the European Commission, the EUWI is a partnership 
process that brings together EU institutions, member states and non-state actors with a view to 
coordinating their financial support for policies in developing countries in the field of water. To this end, 
a network of regional partnerships in Africa, China, the countries of the former Soviet Union, Latin 
America and the Mediterranean aims to connect European donors, experts and investors with policy 
makers and the business community in developing countries. Finding effective solutions to water policy 
problems such as inefficiency, inequity and pollution lies at the heart of the EUWI, and the involvement 
of civil society and non-profit organisations is key to achieving change that responds to local and regional 
needs. This chimes with common notions of integrated water resources management (IWRM), and the 
WFD – as the European embodiment of IWRM – was expected to provide inspiration and, where 
applicable, serve as a blueprint (European Union, 2005; European Commission, 2012b). 
This article contributes to this Special Issue, and to EU water scholarship more broadly, by analysing 
in depth the global influence that the EUWI has had in promoting IWRM policy principles and the extent 
to which the lessons taught and learned in the process reflect the spirit of the WFD. European institutions 
were quick to associate the EUWI with ongoing initiatives to promote sustainable development globally; 
there has not, however, been sufficient exploration in current studies of the extent to which the 
promotion of WFD water management principles and the advancement of sustainable development 
constitute – conceptually or practically – conflicting objectives in an EUWI context. This article therefore 
asks how the EUWI sought to support sustainable development, what role the WFD plays here in 
promoting this agenda, and what factors have shaped the EUWI’s capacity for promoting sustainable 
development globally. Research into this issue could be considered timely due to the promotion of IWRM 
as a mechanism for global sustainable water management in the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
To this end, we look at all five EUWI partnerships: Africa, China, the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, Latin America, and the Mediterranean. We do not, however, report on collaborative platforms set 
up outside the formal structure of the EUWI such as the EU India Water Partnership, nor do we examine 
less structured attempts of countries outside Europe to learn from European experiences in the field of 
water (Heldt et al., 2017). 
Scholarly interest in the EUWI has been scarce and a close reading of available research reveals several 
shortcomings. First, many studies were published in the early years of the Initiative (Partzsch, 2007, 2008, 
2009; Stewart and Gray, 2006, 2009), with only one of more recent vintage (Fritsch et al., 2017). Second, 
there are now five regional partnerships, but there is only one text, published by Partzsch in 2007, that 
explores all four of the partnerships that existed at that time, and its key output, a monograph, is not 
available in the English language. Stewart and Gray (2006, 2009) only look at Africa, while Fritsch et al. 
(2017) study just two regions; the China Europe Water Platform (CEWP) has until now not been analysed 
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at all. Finally, authors observe notable differences between regional partnerships; however, previous 
works underestimate the degree of variance in EUWI partnerships and authors are too quick to attribute 
unique characteristics to local and regional contexts rather than to shifts in EU policy priorities. 
In response, we argue that the origins of the Initiative in global debates on sustainable development 
have led to selective readings of WFD principles in diverse ecological, political and social settings. 
Regional partnerships emphasise different aspects of sustainable development, resulting in three faces 
of the EUWI: an economic one with a focus on investments in water technology; a social one that 
prioritises questions of access, equity and participation; and an environmental one that comes closest to 
current applications of the WFD in Europe. While contextual conditions are important, they only partially 
explain the above patterns; we find that EU and member state foreign policy imperatives are equally, if 
not more, important. We unpack these imperatives and explore how strategic considerations have 
influenced the approach taken by European actors when it comes to promoting aspects of IWRM and the 
WFD in different parts in the world. 
The article proceeds as follows. We first situate the EUWI in a conceptual discussion of sustainable 
development, principles of IWRM, and the ecological goals of the WFD. We then introduce our data and 
methods. The empirical part of this article then presents case studies of all five regional EUWI 
partnerships. Our final section compares these cases and discusses avenues for future research. 
SITUATING THE EUWI: THE WFD, IWRM AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Our article explores the degree to which the WFD, via the EUWI, has influenced water policies outside 
Europe. This raises a number of conceptual questions. While the Directive is widely conceived of as being 
the most prominent embodiment of IWRM in Europe (Griffiths, 2002; Grimeaud, 2004; Lubell and 
Edelenbos, 2013), the EUWI seems to also represent a pan-European attempt to support sustainable 
development in the field of water (Partzsch, 2007). We argue that forcing these four policies and political 
discourses – EUWI, IWRM, sustainable development and the WFD – into one frame(work) in the hope 
that this would result in a harmonious and appealing piece of art is a testing enterprise. 
EUWI 
Let us first look at the EUWI. The origins of the Initiative have been described elsewhere (Partzsch, 2007). 
Prompted by the 2000 UN Millennium Summit and the 2002 UN World Summit, the EUWI initially aimed 
to coordinate ongoing – and to generate new – EU and member state funding streams in relation to 
development aid in the field of water. Policy documents published from this period emphasise the 
commitment to sustainable approaches to water management and to sustainable development as a 
general political vision (European Commission, 2002a, 2002b, 2003c). This "strategic approach for 
sustainable access to and management of water resources integrates sectoral and cross-cutting issues 
and encompasses all aspect [sic] of sustainability", explicitly bringing together "economic, social and 
environmental sustainability" (European Commission, 2002b: 3). Practically, this would suggest working 
towards clean water and functional aquatic ecosystems, adopting participatory decision-making 
arrangements, gender justice and a fair distribution of water, and regulating economies such that societal 
welfare is maximised without compromising the natural environment. 
IWRM 
By 'integrating sectorial and cross-cutting issues' the EUWI also links to IWRM principles. Recognising the 
importance of IWRM as a globally leading paradigm to govern water resources, the EU leaves no doubt 
that the integrated management of our aquatic environment is key to pursuing the above-mentioned 
sustainability agenda (European Commission, 2002b: 15-18). 
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Since its inception, IWRM has taken several twists and turns and it appears currently to be a 
multifaceted phenomenon (Biswas, 2004; Allan, 2012; Grigg, 2014). Despite its fluidity, however, some 
common features prevail; a typical IWRM laundry list regularly includes ambitious water policy goals, 
water supply and sewerage mechanisms, equitable access to water, water pricing, innovative governance 
arrangements, public participation, and water management at hydrological scales (Savenije and Van der 
Zaag, 2008; Lubell and Edelenbos, 2013). The idea of 'integration' serves as an umbrella here, promoting 
the insight that the joint consideration of multiple water functions, uses and government authorities 
across levels and scales is likely to better achieve the move away from established techno-fix solutions 
towards more progressive approaches (Wolsink, 2006; Molle, 2009). 
In this sense, IWRM may be compatible with popular notions of sustainable development (GWP-TAC, 
2000; Allan, 2012; Varis et al., 2014; Benson et al., 2015), although this is certainly not the only feasible 
reading (Biswas, 2004; Mukhtarov and Gerlak, 2014). Perhaps to ensure that mutually compatible 
understandings of IWRM and sustainability come to mind, early EU documents prefer to speak of 
"sustainable integrated water resources management" (European Commission, 2002b: 3), thereby 
providing a more specific link between IWRM and the EUWI’s origins in sustainable development. 
WFD 
The more troublesome question, however, concerns the potential role of the WFD in the EUWI. There is 
no denying the centrality of the Directive: all EU policy documents related to the design and 
establishment of the Initiative mention the WFD as a pioneering statute in the field of water that may 
serve as an example, if not a template (European Commission, 2002a, 2002b: 14, 2003c: 5; European 
Union, 2005: 5). The extent to which, and how, the WFD could really be transferred to EUWI partner 
countries, however, is not elaborated upon in these publications; they tend, rather, to namecheck the 
Directive at convenient places throughout the texts but remain silent about its scope of application in 
overseas contexts. 
This is not a trivial matter. True, the WFD possesses many features of IWRM. The Directive aims to 
achieve ambitious water quality goals and contains provisions – although less forceful – for regulating 
water quantity. The WFD also obliges member states to manage water at hydrological scales, calls for 
public participation in water planning and management, and promotes the polluter-pays principle; we 
therefore share the sentiments of many colleagues that the WFD is the prime legal instrument in Europe 
for implementing IWRM principles (Griffiths, 2002; Grimeaud, 2004; Lubell and Edelenbos, 2013). At the 
same time, however, the Directive represents a somewhat eclectic approach to integrated management. 
This is because water quality considerations dominate this statute, and most IWRM-style elements of the 
Directive are subordinate to the achievement of good water status. To illustrate this point, mainstream 
IWRM approaches promote the involvement of non-state actors as a tool to enable policy integration; 
however, they also articulate a link between public participation and water justice, equity and legitimacy. 
The WFD, in contrast, advances participatory governance arrangements in an attempt to improve the 
quality of the aquatic environment, i.e. policy effectiveness (European Commission, 2003a; Newig and 
Koontz, 2013). Some principles typically associated with IWRM are missing entirely; this includes gender 
equality, equal access to water, and the reduction of poverty (Rahaman et al., 2004). Arguably, the WFD 
reflects an understanding of IWRM that is significantly narrower than the notion of 'sustainable IWRM' 
found in EUWI policy documents. 
We observe a similar pattern regarding the link between sustainable development and the WFD. The 
Directive mentions the terms 'sustainable' and 'sustainability' 13 times, typically in the context of 
'sustainable water use' or in phrases such as 'sustainable water management'; however, in line with the 
overall ambition of the WFD – good water status, a metric that describes biological, chemical and 
geomorphological qualities of water – these references describe a commitment to environmental 
sustainability (WFD Preamble 41). There is no indication that the Directive aims to maximise notions of 
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economic or social sustainability; in fact, some elements of the WFD may directly contradict such notions, 
for instance the commodification of water through market-based water pricing mechanisms. Water 
quantity features in a groundwater context but, again, the overall idea is to benefit aquatic ecosystems 
rather than human welfare. In short, the WFD was designed as an environmental policy directive. It was 
never meant to be something else. It would therefore be misleading to promote the WFD as a tool to 
advance a more extensive understanding of sustainability. Earlier writings have come to similar 
conclusions (Partzsch, 2007). 
Consequently, the potential to promote sustainable water policy principles through the WFD was 
limited from the outset. The Directive is an ambitious piece of legislation that deserves to be taken 
seriously in jurisdictions overseas, but it only covers a part of what the EUWI aims to achieve. This is, 
however, not the only challenge that the EUWI faces when it comes to its thematic priorities. 
Flexibility 
The other constraint is related to the inbuilt flexibility of the EUWI. Yes, the Initiative breathes the spirit 
of sustainable development; however, the EUWI does not come with a legally binding mandate to stay 
on track here, and no mechanism except political good will is in place to ensure that implementation 
reflects the visionary aspirations articulated back in 2002. The key objectives of the Water Initiative, for 
example, provide a great degree of freedom with regard to building water partnerships. The objectives 
mainly describe managerial activities, and it is somewhat ironic that the only mention of the term 
'sustainable' refers to maintaining a steady cash flow: 
Strengthening political commitment to action and innovation-oriented partnership. Promoting better water 
governance, capacity building and awareness. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of water 
management through multi-stakeholder dialogue and co-ordination. Strengthening co-operation by 
promoting river-basin approaches in national and transboundary waters. Identifying additional sources of 
funding and mechanisms to ensure sustainable financing (European Commission, 2003c: 23). 
These objectives do not undermine the original agenda of the EUWI; however, they remind us that the 
EUWI is a political strategy that gives participating actors opportunities to pursue their interests in line 
with the politics of the day, here referring to the European institutions and member states taking the 
lead in specific partnership programmes, but also government actors in partner countries. 
The EUWI, moreover, does not operate in a political vacuum. The Initiative is embedded in a wide 
range of activities in the space of EU development cooperation that may differ by region but, by and 
large, follow EU development and foreign policy imperatives that are larger than the EUWI. The 
environment certainly plays a role but is likely to be overshadowed by economic and social 
considerations. The more the structural confines of EU development aid and the interests involved lead 
the EUWI away from environmental sustainability goals, the less prominent the contribution of the WFD 
will be to water policy change in EUWI partner countries. 
The Initiative’s partnership approach likewise emphasises the importance of EUWI target countries 
outside Europe for the joint identification of policy priorities in specific regional contexts. Collaborative 
governance arrangements are useful for enhancing the legitimacy of the EUWI and for securing 
ownership for measures and projects; however, power transfer in participatory settings, by implication, 
means loss of control (Arnstein, 1969). The joint development of operational objectives in regional 
partnerships may therefore result in policy programmes that are only partially compatible with notions 
of sustainable development or, specifically, environmental sustainability, again reducing the potentially 
transformative power of the WFD in EUWI activities. 
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Implications 
The EUWI, consequently, may have many faces. In this article, we use the three pillars of sustainability – 
economic, environmental and social – to describe three ideal interpretations of the Initiative; the WFD is 
likely to take a prominent role in only the environmental one. This means that we expect a high degree 
of fragmentation in terms of policy contents; this opens the door to institutional fragmentation, that is, 
scenarios where regional partnerships begin to emancipate themselves from the EUWI secretariat in 
Brussels and the vision of the EUWI that the secretariat represents (for a conceptual discussion, see Zelli 
and van Asselt, 2013.) To be clear, this will not be the focus of our article – we are interested primarily in 
the forms and contents of EUWI partnerships and the role that the WFD plays therein – but this thought 
will be important during the later stages of our analysis. 
The extent to which the WFD has actually informed EUWI activities is an empirical question. We will 
explore this question in the remainder of the article. 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Our research encompasses a multi-case comparative design focusing on five EUWI variants: Africa, China, 
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Latin America, and the Mediterranean. The EU-India 
Water Partnership is not formally a part of the EUWI and was therefore disregarded in the context of this 
article. 
Our analytical framework is informed by the expectation that the EUWI aims, inter alia, to transfer 
WFD water management principles and institutional arrangements to regions outside Europe. Based on 
a thorough reading of both the WFD-related social science literature (Boeuf and Fritsch, 2016) and of the 
Directive itself, we developed a list of items that could potentially be the object of policy transfer; these 
include: a set of ambitious and conceptually sophisticated environmental objectives (see Article 4, WFD), 
transparent mechanisms to justify the departure from those objectives (Article 4), the establishment of 
river basin districts and the pursuit of management activities at ecological scales (Article 3), the 
preparation of RBMPs (Article 13) and more specific PoMs (Article 11), public consultation and active 
involvement in planning and management activities (Article 14), and systematic attempts, similar to those 
of the Common Implementation Strategy, to reflect on and improve planning and management activities. 
Needless to say, we expected terminologies to be different across regions. We were looking for attempts 
to do justice to the spirit of the Directive; this included, for instance, measures to achieve policy 
integration beyond the water sector. We also aimed to distinguish different degrees of legal compulsion 
in the application of these arrangements and principles. 
Scholars studying the implementation of the WFD within the EU may find that the above framework 
lacks detail; however, we considered it to be appropriate. This is, as we discovered during our research, 
because there were only two EUWI partnerships defined by genuine intentions to transfer key principles 
of the WFD; furthermore, the progress made in these two partnerships suggested that it would be more 
worthwhile to present findings in terms of transfer intentions rather than transfer outcomes. (We will 
report on these two partnerships later.) 
This led us to revisit the ambition of the project with a view to exploring the aims and objectives of 
EUWI partnerships more broadly and the limited role of the WFD therein. We did not use an analytical 
framework upfront as we considered that this would restrict us in our analysis; instead, we systematised 
our findings ex-post. The underlying assumption was that water is a natural resource but that this does 
not necessarily mean that water policy is always environmental policy. Water can be a common 
denominator in a range of different policy areas; while this may include environmental and ecological 
considerations, activities may also relate to social justice, welfare and health, or to economic growth and 
trade. We later relate these major issue areas to the three pillars of sustainable development in order to 
highlight the different priorities taken in EUWI partnerships. 
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Qualitative data was derived from an analysis of 237 official EU, EUWI and national government 
documents; these included annual implementation reports, meeting minutes, conference presentations 
and webpages. 
This data was triangulated with 32 semi-structured interviews with relevant policy actors from EU, 
international, and global levels; these actors included European Commission officials from the 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, from EU 
member states and EUWI partner countries, plus a variety of non-governmental actors in Europe and the 
EUWI regions. Included also were consultants who have advised the EUWI and the European Commission 
as well as national governments and sectoral business associations. Interviews were carried out in person, 
on the phone, and via Skype. 
We used NVivo to code a subset of policy documents, particularly for teasing out the EUWI’s 
relationship to concepts such as IWRM or sustainable development. The documentary evidence and the 
interviews were then combined to construct the case study analyses presented in the remainder of the 
article. 
AFRICA WORKING GROUP 
The original focus of the EUWI was Africa. During the period of the EUWI’s formation in 2002, Africa was 
falling short of meeting the Millennium Development Goal to reduce by half the proportion if its 
population lacking sustainable access to basic sanitation and safe drinking water by 2015 (World Health 
Organization and United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, 2004). The Africa Working 
Group (AWG) – the EUWI’s regional partnership in Africa – was established to coordinate and implement 
the 2002 EU-Africa Strategic Partnership on Water Affairs and Sanitation, which aimed at helping 
countries in the region to achieve this Millennium Development Goal (European Commission, 2003c). 
This points us to an important insight. The origins of the EUWI cannot be divorced from the paramount 
interest of the EU and the member states in contributing to poverty reduction and welfare in Africa. These 
priorities are documented in a string of international agreements and EU policies, from the establishment 
of the European Development Fund in 1957 to the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions of the 1960s and 
1970s, the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, the 2000 Millennium Development Goals, the 2005 European 
Consensus on Development, and, more recently, the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (Carbone, 2007). 
Overall, these policies advance a social understanding of sustainability (also see European Parliament, 
2017). This is not the place to discuss the motives and incentives behind EU development aid (again, see 
Carbone, 2007); what matters is that the EUWI’s partnership with Africa reflects, and operates within, 
political discourses that aim to pursue a development agenda. A simple indicator provides a reason: the 
vast majority of all EU policy documents about the EUWI were drafted by the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development. 
These thematic priorities became more evident as the African EUWI partnership evolved over time. 
The AWG’s key implementing instrument was high-level dialogues between the European Commission, 
EU member states and the African Minister’s Council on Water, whose aim was the promotion of a water, 
sanitation and health agenda. This included raising awareness, attracting donors, and coordinating the 
myriad of EU programmes in the field of water-related development aid (European Commission, 2006b, 
2009, 2012b). An Africa-EU Statement on Sanitation was issued in 2008 and subsequently endorsed by 
African Union leaders; they, in turn, agreed to the eThekwini Declaration and its associated AfricaSan 
Action Plan in 2008 (European Commission, 2012b). Under the eThekwini Declaration, signed by 32 
African countries, national governments pledged to work towards the achievement of the sanitation 
targets of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 (African Union, 2008). To this end, the Africa 
Caribbean Pacific-European Union (ACP-EU) Water Facility, set up in 2004, helped finance investments 
for sanitation and supply in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific nations (European Commission, 2004a). 
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Despite these evidently urgent priorities, sanitation and supply constituted only one component of 
the AWG’s activities. As we have shown earlier, the EUWI’s political agenda articulated a broader vision 
of sustainable development, one that would include economic and environmental considerations 
(European Commission, 2002a, 2002b, 2003c). Tackling questions of transboundary water management, 
the AWG’s second component reflects this wider agenda of the EUWI. 
This second component aimed, through the creation of national-level country dialogues, to transfer 
WFD elements wholesale from the EU to African countries (European Commission, 2006b); this included 
river basin management at ecological scales as well as public participation. Results of this transfer 
strategy proved limited, mainly due to mismatches between the technical demands of WFD 
implementation and the domestic resources available to meet its requirements (Matz and Lofgren, 2008). 
By 2007, the country dialogue approach had been effectively wound down in favour of the 
aforementioned development theme; the transfer of IWRM to African states, however, remained on the 
agenda, although the WFD is not explicitly mentioned and follow-up activities are scarce (African 
Minister’s Council on Water, 2012; European Commission, 2015). 
Since then, support by African states for the transfer of IWRM norms has been to an extent 
superseded by the AWG’s interest in promoting the water-energy-food nexus, a supposedly holistic 
developmental concept that is based on integrating water management objectives with those for 
agricultural and energy production (Benson et al., 2015; European Commission, 2016). This support 
should not, however, be interpreted as a concession to those aiming to bring back notions of 
environmental sustainability; on the contrary, the focus on food and energy provision merely suggests 
an extension and reformulation of the AWG’s social sustainability priorities. 
These priorities also remained in place when the EUWI ceased to exist in 2016 as an overarching 
process for coordinating EU development aid in the field of water. The question of why this happened is 
beyond the scope of this article; that said, some partnerships, specifically those in Latin America and the 
Mediterranean, were discontinued without replacement or follow-up initiatives, while others – the 
African and the Eastern European EUWI partnerships – resumed in the format of a funded EU programme. 
Only the newest partnership, the China Europe Water Platform, proceeded without change. In the 
context of Africa, this follow-up programme is the Africa-EU Water Partnership Project (AEWPP). 
It is too early to assess what difference the new format makes. These differences may occur in terms 
of mission, funding and control; that is, focused objectives, guaranteed funding and more control with 
the AEWPP, versus ambiguous objectives, less secure funding, and less control for the EU due to its 
partnership approach, with the AWG. What can be said is that the AEWPP, coordinated by the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency, has not deviated from the direction taken by the AWG. 
The AEWPP focuses on the Sustainable Development Goals and the Africa Water Vision for 2025, 
reflecting the values expressed in the 2014 Africa-EU Summit Declaration and Road Map; some 
entrepreneurial language, however, has crept into recent AEWPP. statements which goes beyond the 
terminology normally used by the AWG: 
The project will continue to provide a platform for dialogue and coordination but also adds a 
component directly aimed at catalysing finance for investment in water infrastructure in Africa. This 
component aims at filling the gap between project ideas or ready-designed projects and bankable 
financing proposals, and will identify and select a few project proposals, work them into bankable 
business cases and facilitate access to capital investment, possibly leveraged by EU blending and grants 
(Stockholm International Water Institute, no date) 
As we will demonstrate in the next section, this rhetoric and thinking is a typical feature of the EUWI’s 
regional platform in China. For the time being, we do not conclude that the African water partnership has 
made a programmatic U-turn; instead, we maintain that the EUWI partnership in Africa has shown and, 
for the moment at least, shows a face that emphasises the tenets of social sustainability. 
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CHINA EUROPE WATER PLATFORM 
The China Europe Water Platform (CEWP) is the last partnership established under the EUWI label; it has 
been in operation since 2012 (China Europe Water Platform, 2014). The differences between it and the 
Africa partnership could not be greater. 
Supported by a secretariat in China and one in Europe, the CEWP aims to address four themes: energy 
security, river basin management, rural water and food security, and urbanisation. Within this 
framework, partner countries administer co-led programmes, for instance on flooding (with the 
Netherlands), groundwater (with Denmark) or hydropower (with Austria). The three cross-cutting themes 
of business, governance and research, however, are more important to understanding the unique nature 
of the CEWP (European Commission, 2014, 2016). 
In line with the EUWI’s philosophy, the CEWP does not provide any direct funding; in contrast to other 
regional platforms, however, the available budget for water-related EU development aid is small in China. 
The number of EUWI-funded projects that require coordination is therefore relatively limited as well; 
instead, CEWP partner countries participate at their own expense and identify new funding sources 
(China Europe Water Platform, 2014). This arrangement requires substantial effort. It not only delayed a 
timely take-off; it also explains the unique profile that the CEWP has developed over time. In the absence 
of alternative funding sources, CEWP activities focus first and foremost on the cross-cutting theme of 
business as this is where partner countries see opportunities for funding and collaboration. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, many CEWP activities reflect the interests of the business community rather than 
a transformative sustainability agenda. If at all, the economic pillar of sustainability would come into play 
whereby the CEWP’s Business and Innovation Program serves to enable market access for products and 
services, initiates business collaborations, and offers market analyses. To illustrate this point, the Horizon 
2020-funded EU project 'PIANO' (Policies, Innovation, and Network for enhancing Opportunities for 
China-Europe water cooperation), associated with the CEWP’s 'research' theme, did not study 
environmental or social aspects of water, but rather prepared business reports (see, for instance, 
Spooner, 2018). Participation in conferences, expos and trade fairs plays a major role in the CEWP; to this 
end, it collaborates closely with the EU Chamber of Commerce, the EU Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises Centre, and the China Intellectual Property Rights Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Helpdesk (China Europe Water Platform, 2015). Consultancy and expertise are an emerging sector, but 
interview evidence suggests that technology and engineering solutions are more important. Due to the 
lack of multilateral funding, CEWP projects tend to be bilateral and represent the interests of the 
engineering- and technology-heavy economies of the EU such as Denmark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden (European Commission, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). 
All this activity is well in line with the overall relationship that China and the EU have developed over 
the past four decades. In the 1985 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the 
European Economic Community and the People’s Republic of China and the 2013 EU-China 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, the European Commission summarised the nature of this 
relationship in numerous official statements (European Commission, 1995, 2001, 2008b). Identifying a 
'comprehensive' (1998), a 'maturing' (2003b) and finally a 'close' partnership (2006a), EU-China relations 
are chiefly defined in economic terms (Smith, 2016; Freeman, 2017), and the EU has become China’s 
biggest trading partner (Taneja, 2010). 
The EU has always attempted to supplement improved trade relations with enhanced political 
influence (Freeman, 2017); this has been unsuccessful, however, as China seems to put a high premium 
on averting "unsolicited advice" (Chang and Pieke, 2018: 325) and on developing a partnership that leaves 
"no room (…) for one side to 'socialize' the other into anything" (Taneja, 2010: 378). Economic and 
political questions are therefore kept separate in China-EU relations (Maher, 2016; Michalski and Nilsson, 
2019). This has implications for another cross-cutting theme of the CEWP, namely 'governance'. 
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Arguably, the implementation of IWRM principles requires both legislative measures and governance 
reforms. We do not see many of these in China and, in fact, we note few attempts to push such an agenda 
within the context of the CEWP. The incentives for European participants are obvious: "By globalizing EU 
norms, such as environmental standards, the EU could create a level playing field for European business 
and other nonmarket social values" (Chen, 2016: 779). We offer three explanations. 
First, the CEWP’s financial architecture prioritises marketable innovations, services and technologies, 
and there is no genuine business case for the adoption of IWRM reforms. One may ask – in light of the 
wider sustainable development context in which the EUWI operates – to what extent the business-
friendly and technology-oriented approach taken by the CEWP is at all compatible with notions of 
environmental sustainability. The tension between the interests of a few EU member states and those 
aiming to promote the public interest – that is, integrated and sustainable water management – is not 
unique; in fact, it seems to be a common feature of the EU’s relations with China (Smith, 2016). 
The second explanation may be that some IWRM principles are simply hard to sell on the Chinese 
market of ideas; this is particularly true if they contradict the present hierarchical-governance model, 
which applies in the case of public participation and bids to recalibrate the balance of power on the 
centralisation – decentralisation scale (Deng et al., 2016; see also Li and Wagenaar, 2019). 
Third, three EU-funded programmes have already dealt with questions of IWRM in China. The Europe-
China River Basin Management Programme (2007-2012, i.e. prior to the establishment of the CEWP) was 
aimed at advancing WFD water management principles in China; key to the programme were joint 
research projects and training sessions in areas as diverse as climate change adaptation, pollution load 
modelling, and monitoring (EUWI, 2012). The EU-China Environmental Governance Programme (2011-
2015) promoted environmental rights as enshrined in the 1998 Aarhus Convention, specifically the 
provision of environmental information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental 
decision-making. Lastly, the EU-China Environmental Sustainability Programme (2013-2016) tackled 
various environmental problems including water management and heavy metal water pollution. These 
programmes had two things in common: first, unlike the CEWP, they came with their own funding and 
were therefore independent from industry and the politics of the day; second, their status as 
programmes ensured a focus on, and commitment to, previously agreed objectives, while the CEWP, in 
contrast, tends to fly high and to have vague goals that fail to provide direction (Yang, 2017). While these 
were promising conditions for water policy transfer, environmental sustainability seems to have a low 
priority in the Chinese water sector compared to water supply and sewerage, water security and flood 
control, and rapid urbanisation. The current focus on water infrastructure and technology certainly 
reflects China’s perspectives on the matter; however, it also perpetuates a development which started 
with the aforementioned (pre-CEWP) EU-China River Basin Management Programme, where European 
partners inventively linked the promotion of WFD principles to the export of the latest engineering 
solutions ("It was about selling the kit, selling the technology", one interviewee said). Chinese water 
managers still express a genuine, if somewhat uncommitted, interest in the WFD; there is little evidence, 
however, that the WFD has so far made inroads into China’s water management (Deng et al., 2016). What 
remains is the sympathy for technology and infrastructure that has informed the CEWP since its 
establishment in 2012 when the EU-China River Basin Management Programme came to an end. 
Interview evidence suggests, moreover, that institutional reforms are likely to fall on deaf ears if found 
incompatible with current governance principles in China; there is also a general reluctance to accept 
Western comment on highly political questions. Apart from the funding situation which sets the CEWP 
on a business trajectory, this resistance to change and reluctance to accept Western comment may 
explain why IWRM/WFD questions of governance and institutions feature less prominently in the CEWP. 
Overall, economic considerations dominate this partnership. This is not to say that no work is being 
done that could be interpreted as pursuing environmental or social sustainability goals – it is! CEWP 
workshops and annual meetings provide opportunities for academic exchange and for learning from best 
practices, and the importance of environmental sustainability is emphasised; other activities may help 
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tackle water supply and sanitation problems, thereby entering the realm of social sustainability 
(European Commission, 2013, 2014, 2016). Generally, however, the extent to which such activities result 
in lasting change depends on the degree to which they are compatible with a business agenda. 
The future may look somewhat different, though. The Turku Declaration and the subsequent report 
on water sustainability (China Europe Water Platform, 2017, 2018) brought a more balanced 
understanding of sustainability back into the discussion. It is too early to assess the impact of these 
documents, but it may well be that the WFD gets a second chance in China soon. 
EUWI EASTERN EUROPE, CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA 
The EUWI’s partnership for Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia (EUWI-EECCA), established in 
2003, brings together 12 countries from the former Soviet Union. It was primarily composed of national 
government authorities, the European Commission and EU member state representatives, as well as 
strategic partners such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, and international financial institutions (European 
Commission, 2007a, 2011). In contrast to Africa and China, this regional partnership was consistently 
predicated upon a water policy reform agenda rather than economic and social development priorities 
(Fritsch et al., 2017); this is because the activities of the Eastern water partnership are closely linked to 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
The ENP emerged in the early 2000s in response to the paradox that while the EU is unable to enlarge 
infinitely, it takes an interest in a safe and stable external environment. This objective can supposedly be 
best achieved if the countries constituting the EU’s external environment approximate, if not adopt, the 
institutional structures, legislative frameworks, and political values of the EU and its member states 
(Bengtsson, 2008; Casier, 2011). Typically formalised through an association agreement, neighbouring 
countries may expect a privileged relationship that paves the way for access to the common market, 
travel and migration arrangements, EU funding in areas such as education and research, and so on. 
Although countries involved may envisage an even deeper form of integration – EU membership – this is 
not a realistic option officially or, at the time of writing, practically (Lavenex, 2004; Gstöhl, 2015). 
In return, neighbouring countries pledge themselves to respecting the values expressed in the 1993 
Copenhagen criteria, which was initially developed in an EU enlargement context; these values include 
civil liberties, democracy and the rule of law. More importantly, privileged relations via the ENP require 
external countries to partly or fully adopt the acquis communautaire, in other words to harmonise their 
domestic legislation with EU law. Whether such a norm transfer is the result of conditionality or EU-
facilitated discourse and socialisation is irrelevant in the context of this article (but see Johansson-
Nogués, 2007; Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009); what matters is that the Eastern 
water partnership operates in the shadow of the ENP and that this influences its political priorities. 
EU water legislation is broad in terms of scope and intent; it tends, however, to reflect the tenet of 
environmental sustainability. Apart from the 2007 Floods Directive, there are no major statutes in the 
field of water that could meaningfully be related to notions of economic or social sustainability; in other 
words, European water law is environmental law. Given that the Eastern water partnership explicitly aims 
to support the European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission, 2012b; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2017), 
this partnership must prioritise the transfer of EU water legislation, in particular its flagship policy, the 
WFD. The Eastern water partnership has therefore developed an environmental rather than an economic 
or social profile. 
In order to facilitate the transfer of WFD principles to Eastern Partnership countries, the EUWI-EECCA 
established a regular forum for exchange and learning, the Joint WFD/EUWI Process. This mechanism, 
essentially, copied the Common Implementation Strategy, an intra-European initiative led by the 
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European Commission to 1) test WFD principles in pilot basins, 2) share best practices, and 3) develop 
implementation guidelines. The Joint Process, however, was not only an EECCA activity; as its name 
suggests, it encouraged learning both between EECCA countries and from EU member states and, to this 
end, access was given to events organised and data prepared in the context of the Common 
Implementation Strategy (European Commission, 2004b). Importantly, the transboundary – that is to say 
international – management of river basins played a major role here; this goes beyond WFD requirements 
which encourage, but do not make legally binding, the joint management of water bodies across 
international borders (in the EU, management at hydrological scales is required within national borders 
only) (European Commission, 2007a, 2008a). 
While the Joint Process operated supranationally, the transposition and implementation of EU water 
policy norms was supposed to take place in national policy dialogues; however, one of the first 
conclusions that these dialogues established was that, due to decades of underinvestment in national 
water infrastructure during the Soviet era, EECCA countries were hardly able to comply with the technical 
requirements of the WFD model in their entirety (European Commission, 2010a). During this time, the 
majority of states had little intention of immediate EU accession and also failed to see the benefits of the 
newly emerging European Neighbourhood Policy. Many EECCA countries, instead, preferred to adopt 
IWRM principles that were downloaded from the international arena via the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
Consequently, the close alignment of the WFD with EECCA national policies that was originally 
anticipated by the EU (European Commission, 2012b), in reality proved to be unrealistic. A patchwork of 
national water policies emerged across the region as national policy dialogues worked to adopt these 
composite policy packages of reforms (for evidence, see the string of EUWI annual reports published by 
the European Commission, 2010a, 2013, 2016). In 2012, for example, in order to inform adoption of new 
national water legislation, Georgia conducted a background study to assess the compatibility with the 
WFD of its existing legal and institutional framework for water (European Commission, 2013). Although 
the WFD then became a significant source of inspiration in the drafting process, the final Water Act was 
more influenced by IWRM principles promoted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(2013). Similarly, the 2012 Azerbaijan draft Water Strategy was aimed primarily at the national adoption 
of IWRM, while incorporating elements from both the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE)’s Water Convention and the WFD (European Commission, 2013). 
About five years ago, however, things changed. In contrast to some of the other EUWI partnerships 
that were silently phased out in 2016, the EUWI-EECCA was reconstituted as the EUWI Plus for Eastern 
Partnership Countries (EUWI+). Three features distinguish the EUWI+ from its predecessor. First, the 
EUWI+ is an EU programme (2016-2020) rather than a platform and it comes with clearly defined 
objectives and a greater sense of focus; second, the effectiveness of EUWI+ activities is enhanced by 
guaranteed funding – the €24.8 million granted by the EU, Austria and France; third, the EUWI+ only 
encompasses Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, i.e. the six countries of the 
Eastern Partnership, a component of the ENP. The EU’s collaboration with Russia and the countries of 
Central Asia will be continued in alternative formats, the precise shape of which is still in flux. 
The EUWI+ still maintains a combination of supranational activities and national policy dialogues. The 
overall aim is to support the implementation of IWRM principles whereby "the Water Framework 
Directive will serve as benchmark for actions" (European Commission, 2017: 40). Drawing on the 
experiences of EU member states during the first WFD management cycle (2009-2015), the programme 
assists EUWI+ partner countries throughout all stages of the cycle, including law-making, establishing 
transboundary river basins, drafting and implementing management plans, involving the public, and also 
monitoring and data management; technical support, institutional twinning, and awareness-raising 
measures are further elements of the EUWI+ (Environment Agency Austria and International Office for 
Water, 2018). 
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It is too early to assess the precise impacts of the EUWI+; it is certainly fair, however, to say that the 
Eastern EUWI partnership has developed a distinct profile that emphasises environmental protection 
rather than economic or social concerns. In doing so, it puts a high premium on the WFD as a blueprint 
for EUWI policy transfer. 
EUWI MEDITERRANEAN 
The EUWI partnership for the Mediterranean (MED-EUWI) shares a number of features with the Eastern 
regional partnership; this is particularly the case with regard to structure and initial ambitions. 
Established in 2003, it was led by Greece and supported by the Mediterranean office of the Global Water 
Partnership. The MED-EUWI involved 16 countries in North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
Southeastern Europe. Until their EU membership bids were successful, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania 
were also members of the partnership (European Commission, 2006b, 2012a, 2016). 
Two major themes defined the work of the Mediterranean partnership: IWRM, on the one hand, and 
water scarcity, sanitation and supply on the other (European Commission, 2012b). The importance of 
tackling problems related to access, hygiene and sewerage cannot be underestimated and we do not 
want to repeat ourselves here as the situation in the Mediterranean is fairly similar to that of sub-Saharan 
Africa, at least so far as the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean and Northern Africa are concerned 
(World Bank, 2007). As was the case in sub-Saharan Africa, the MED-EUWI relied on national policy 
dialogues and specialist workshops to raise awareness, identify donors, share best practices, and transfer 
technology. These activities accounted for a large share of the attention, funds and time dedicated in the 
region, and they did so for good reasons (European Commission, 2007a, 2011, 2016). From a European 
perspective, this thematic focus can be traced back to the EU’s overall development agenda which 
effectively links to attempts to stabilise the region, manage migration, enhance welfare, and improve 
trade relations, all pursued in the context of the ENP and beyond (Holland, 2002; Philippart, 2003; Bicchi, 
2010). 
Let us now move to IWRM as approached by the Mediterranean section of the Joint WFD/EUWI 
Process. Building on the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements of the 1990s, the ENP established 
a framework for collaboration with the countries of the region more than 15 years ago (Gstöhl, 2015). 
The Joint Process in the Mediterranean aims, as in EECCA, to support the harmonisation of water 
legislation. It also relies on the same set of instruments: pilot river basins (in Lebanon and Morocco), 
conferences and workshops to learn from best practices, and support in legal transposition. The Joint 
Process is structured by six working groups, on groundwater, monitoring, rural problems, transboundary 
management, wastewater and water scarcity. The Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know-
How in the Water Sector (EMWIS), an electronic communication interface, helps share data, documents 
and information (European Commission, 2004b, 2010b). 
This is not to suggest, however, that the MED-EUWI was set on the same trajectory; in fact, three 
factors distinguish the MED-EUWI from its Eastern counterpart. 
First, the WFD has a reputation for representing the water priorities of countries in Northwestern 
Europe. It promotes governance concepts borrowed from political systems from this part of the world 
and tackles a problem – water pollution – that receives greater attention in this region; in contrast, due 
to the predominant ecological conditions, Mediterranean countries worry more about questions of water 
quantity and supply. This raises the question of the extent to which the WFD is at all a suitable legislative 
instrument to guide management processes in dry regions; the Mediterranean participants in the Joint 
Process, at least, experienced "major difficulties" and suggested that the ecological characteristics of the 
region require approaches and targets more appropriate to the Mediterranean context (European 
Commission, 2007b: 2). Likewise, principles such as public participation were hard to introduce in 
countries with weak civil society and with political systems that reflect authoritarian traditions (European 
Commission, 2011). 
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The second factor distinguishing the MED-EUWI from its Eastern counterpart is that, throughout the 
partnership period, the region has suffered from armed combat and civil war; this includes the Arab 
Spring, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and hostilities in Lebanon, Syria and other countries. Not surprisingly, 
the precarious security situation has affected the overall working conditions of the MED-EUWI and its 
overall ability to effect change on the ground (see, for instance, European Commission, 2013); more 
importantly, however, violent conflict resulted in considerable damage to water infrastructure in the 
region, diverting attention away from IWRM to reconstruction and development and leading us back to 
the aforementioned sanitation and supply agenda. 
The third factor is that MED-EUWI partnership countries soon lost hope that legal harmonisation 
would bring them any closer to receiving associate status with the EU. To advance stability and welfare 
in the Mediterranean, the Union for the Mediterranean was established in 2008; it comprised the EU and 
its member states as well as 15 countries in Southeastern Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean and North 
Africa. Although formally not a component of the ENP, the Union seeks to achieve similar objectives, 
which is why members take the ambitions of the Union as a general indicator of the EU’s interest in 
pursuing further integration with Mediterranean countries. In contrast to the aforementioned Eastern 
Partnership, however, the Union was soon associated with embodying the "end of the Euro-
Mediterranean vision" (Kausch and Youngs, 2009; Bicchi, 2011). While the Union encouraged cooperation 
in "relatively uncontroversial areas (…) such as solar power, maritime transport, civil protection, 
education and small businesses" (Kausch and Youngs, 2009: 964), the organisation seemed to do less to 
address the more fundamental problems of civil liberties, democracy and the rule of law, which were 
holding countries in the region back from further integration. Kausch and Youngs suggest that, "[t]he EU 
has moved further and further away from seeking a 'ring of well-governed states' on its southern edge 
and towards seeking a 'ring of firmly governed states'" (ibid: 967). As a result, MED-EUWI countries 
identified a mismatch between programmes encouraging legal harmonisation and higher-level policies 
indicative of integration fatigue; this significantly affected the work and effectiveness of the Joint Process. 
By implication, therefore, the MED-EUWI displays a mixed picture. The partnership emphasised the 
importance of transboundary water management and other IWRM principles; this was in no small part 
due to its involvement in the WFD/EUWI Joint Process and, in its attempt to work towards environmental 
sustainability, made it look like a twin sister of the EUWI-EECCA. The Mediterranean countries, however, 
showed a much greater appetite for questions of scarcity, sanitation and supply; political developments 
in the region and in the EU contributed to the prioritisation of a social sustainability agenda, which de-
emphasised the WFD’s potential role in water management in the Mediterranean. 
Practical challenges greatly affected the degree to which the MED-EUWI was able to realise its 
potential; these included the lack of stability, not to mention the 2008 economic crisis and the post-2009 
Euro crisis which prevented Greece from leading the partnership to the best of its abilities (European 
Commission, 2016). The MED-EUWI was quietly terminated in 2016 with no direct follow-up programme; 
it is an open question whether the gap can be filled by new non-EUWI initiatives such as the Water 
Strategy in the Western Mediterranean. 
EUWI LATIN AMERICA 
The EUWI partnership for Latin America (EUWI-LA) is an exceptional case as it has consistently struggled 
to develop a distinct profile and become a major player in its own right. In reference to the analogy, used 
in this article, of the three faces of the EUWI – economic, social and environmental – we suggest that the 
EUWI-LA had no face at all. 
The EUWI-LA was first announced in 2002 and began operating in 2004. Initially supported by Mexico 
and Portugal as co-leads, it was mainly Spain that carried the torch (European Commission, 2006b, 2007a, 
2008a). This points to the first of two major problems that would seal the fate of the EUWI-LA, that is, 
that the Initiative suffered from a lack of commitment, both from the European institutions and from 
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member states other than Spain (this is testified to by numerous EUWI annual reports, see, for instance, 
European Commission, 2014: 25). The European Commission had already invested sizable sums in other 
water-related programmes in Latin America; it expected member states and the business community to 
take the lead in EUWI-LA, in line with the assumption that the EUWI was not a donor agency but a 
platform for mainstreaming existing initiatives and creating new synergies (European Commission, 
2012b). EU member states, however, displayed little interest as there was not much to gain, despite the 
presence of shared rivers in French Guiana; EUWI partnerships elsewhere promised greater returns, as 
we have shown earlier. At the same time Spain’s resources were limited, particularly after the 2008 
financial crisis. 
On the other hand, the EUWI-LA operated in an environment that was densely populated by various 
regional initiatives and EU-funded programmes with larger budgets that its own. This includes the 
Conference of Ibero-American Water Directors (CODIA), a network established in 2001 bringing together 
22 Ibero-American countries. CODIA activities range from capacity building at technical, managerial and 
political level to stakeholder dialogues aimed at technology transfer and mutual learning (European 
Commission, 2008a, 2013). Training also was a key component of two EuropeAid-funded programmes, 
the Latin American Network of Centres of Excellence in Water (RALCEA) and WaterClima. RALCEA, 
operating between 2010 and 2014, relied on €2.25 million to establish a network of academic institutions 
across the continent to train the next generation of water managers on various governance aspects such 
as participation, sanitation and water quality. Waterclima (2013-2017), with a budget of €8.75 million, 
helped water managers develop skills to cope with climate change mitigation and adaptation; 
additionally, the Latin American Investment Facility provided loans and grants for infrastructure projects 
in the fields of climate, energy, environment and transport. The total investment sum was €5 billion, of 
which €200 million came from the EU (European Commission, 2014, 2015, 2016). 
Although these programmes featured prominently in EUWI annual reports, none of them were direct 
or indirect outputs of the EUWI-LA. CODIA, in part resembling the shape and function of the WFD’s 
Common Implementation Strategy, had already come into being prior to the establishment of the Water 
Initiative, and while the EUWI-LA helped run their permanent secretariat, it remained somewhat 
disconnected from CODIA’s core activities. EUWI documents, in fact, talked about the "need to 
strengthen and enhance cooperation and coordination between the processes of EUWI and CODIA and 
seek mechanisms for strengthening collaboration and participation of EUWI in the activities promoted by 
the CODIA" (European Commission, 2015: 22). Without permanent working groups, and engaged in 
attempts that lacked the "adaptability (…) to the specific socio-economic conditions" in the region (ibid), 
the EUWI-LA failed to make a lasting impression on Latin America’s water sector; at the same time, it 
would be misleading to see CODIA as the very embodiment of the EUWI in Latin America, not the least 
because the relative lack of European participation was incompatible with the EUWI’s partnership 
approach. 
Obviously, only if the EUWI commands the means to do so will it be able to successfully synchronise 
activities, facilitate events and disseminate knowledge. In Latin America, however, CODIA has enjoyed 
much greater authority and legitimacy than the EUWI-LA ever did; in fact, the funding governed by the 
various EuropeAid programmes led to a paradoxical situation where the EUWI-LA, as the implied centre 
of water-related EU activities in Latin America, was much weaker than the dynamic projects that it was 
supposed to coordinate. Left in a limbo as to what its aims, functions and achievements really were, it is 
not surprising that the EUWI-LA was one of those partnerships that was phased out in 2016 without a 
direct follow-up initiative. 
So to what extent did the EUWI-LA contribute to the promotion of WFD principles in Latin America? 
The answer is: not much. True, quite a few initiatives in the region focused on questions of environmental 
sustainability, including transboundary water management, water pricing and water reuse; others 
brought in ideas compatible with economic and social sustainability in the field of water. In line with the 
more general development-oriented goals that these programmes pursued, however, a good number of 
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activities, particularly capacity building and training events, provided technical skills with no particular 
focus on IWRM or the WFD; more importantly, few, if any, were actually true EUWI-LA activities. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our opening argument was based on the hypothesis that the origins of the EUWI in global debates over 
sustainable development would lead to divergent interpretations of the WFD, each emphasising different 
'faces' or manifestations of its core principles: economic, environmental and social. We also speculated 
that while different ecological, political and social settings could partly account for variations in EUWI 
implementation and the role that the WFD plays therein, a combination of EU, member state and partner 
country government imperatives were equally important. There is certainly evidence from our analyses 
of the five EUWI partnerships to support this argument. 
We demonstrate a pattern of initial centralisation within the EUWI as a whole, which eventually leads 
to divergence from the EU’s original conceptualisation. While the differing contextual conditions in the 
five partnerships are no doubt important factors in shaping the policy priorities of EUWI partnerships, 
the strategic imperatives of partnership constituents are perhaps more significant. 
This divergence in strategic focus includes joint EU-national government priorities for poverty 
reduction and welfare (Africa), water policy reform (EECCA, MED-EUWI), water scarcity, sanitation and 
supply (MED-EUWI), and cooperation around business and research (CEWP). This observation leads us to 
suggest that EUWI partnerships developed distinct thematic profiles over time and that it is these 
distinctions – in addition to the diverging institutional trajectories briefly discussed below – that 
undermine the perception of the EUWI as a coherent political initiative. Specifically, the CEWP first and 
foremost has prioritised economic policy and trade objectives in the water sector; this can also include 
research collaborations and knowledge exchange but these are often in contexts where such cooperation 
might serve to enhance the achievement of trade and growth imperatives. The Africa Working Group 
(the EUWI’s sub-Saharan partnership), in contrast, devised work programmes that mainly tackled water-
related questions of social policy and welfare; these were aimed at opening the door for business 
opportunities, in particular for entrepreneurs based in Europe. The primary ambition, however, was not 
to maximise economic growth and trade but to deal with pressing social problems related to water 
access, education and public health. These themes also fared prominently in the MED-EUWI; however, 
the Mediterranean partnership also aimed to address ecological challenges in the field of water, a 
thematic focus that lies at the heart of the Eastern Partnership, EUWI-EECCA, and its successor, the 
EUWI+. The Latin America partnership faced strong regional competition and, in the end, never 
developed a distinct profile. 
These observations have important implications for the global diffusion of WFD water policy 
principles. Essentially, only the partnerships in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and in the 
Mediterranean were characterised by interest constellations that enabled the transfer of knowledge, 
skills, values and principles and their gradual legal codification in partnership countries. A central role is 
played here by the incentive of further political and economic integration associated with the adoption 
of the EU’s acquis communautaire, a key component of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This 
condition was absent in the cases of the Africa, China and Latin America partnerships. In the absence of 
conditionality and any other functional pressures that would encourage partnership countries to adopt 
key tenets of the WFD in domestic water policy and management, social and economic considerations in 
Africa and China, respectively, overshadowed questions of environmental sustainability. This leads us to 
conclude that, upon sober reflection, the EUWI may report many achievements but has been rather 
ineffective when it comes to promoting the WFD outside of Europe. 
These region-specific imperatives have also set the various partnerships on a divergent institutional 
trajectory. Some were wound down – for instance the EUWI partnership in Latin America – and others, 
such as Africa and the Mediterranean, were transformed into looser collaborative platforms, that is, they 
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underwent institutional fragmentation or reconstitution. We can digress here into an analogy drawn from 
our personal interests. The EUWI could be perceived as a rock band, originally formed to tap into the 
latest musical wave or zeitgeist. Several individualists, typically with different preferences, meet to make 
music together under a common managerial direction. They develop over time, as with other bands, but 
unfortunately move in different directions rather than sticking to the original vision until, after a while, 
the unified artistic approach has largely disappeared. Either some group members endure, taking the 
band in a different musical direction, or the band splits up, with members pursuing solo projects or new 
collaborations. In this way, the various partnership components of the EUWI have grown apart from its 
original founding objectives and, at this point, a reunion tour is unlikely; in the meantime, the zeitgeist 
has moved on, reflecting a changed discourse surrounding the EU’s international role in water 
governance. One lesson for the EU to learn is that a more flexible, adaptive learning approach may be 
advisable, i.e. the EU and member states should be more self-reflexive when it comes to their own 
interests and expectations and should build these insights into the development of, and approach to, any 
similar initiatives in future (Martin-Mazé, 2015). 
This changing 'musical direction' provides several avenues for novel research on the EU’s promotion 
of water policy globally. 
First, our analysis necessarily excluded new band members, in this case the India-EU Water 
Partnership; the IEWP exhibits characteristics of the EUWI but is essentially a novel collaborative network 
in its aims, objectives and configuration. Productive research could be undertaken from a governance 
perspective to understand how such a hybrid approach – call it EUWI 2.0 – compares to other 
partnerships and the extent to which it supports EU and national government imperatives, particularly 
those of India which faces chronic water sustainability issues (United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2013). 
The second possible avenue for novel research is the broader extension of such analyses to encompass 
debates on the EU’s external governance. The notion of the EU as a 'civil power' (Bull, 1982) has been 
subsequently reinterpreted through Manner’s (2002, 2006) concept of 'normative power' (see also 
Forsberg, 2011; Birchfield, 2013) and the idea of the EU as a 'market power' (Damro, 2012). Obvious 
questions for investigation include 1) why the EU chooses to operationalise different forms of power 
within the respective partnership platforms, with further targeted analyses of the underlying strategic 
rationales of EUWI network development; 2) how effective the EU is in its external water governance; 
and 3) whether the EU is learning from its experiences. There can also be further development of links to 
Europeanisation, EU external governance, and neighbourhood policy literature (Schimmelfennig et al., 
2003; Lavenex, 2008; Adelle et al., 2018). 
Finally, an important empirical question is the extent to which such operationalisation of power via 
the EUWI is driving the broader IWRM agenda, given the prioritisation given to these water management 
principles in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. 
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